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STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the lower court properly dismissed appellant's
Complaint against defendant Gibbons and Reed Company ("Gibbons and
Reed"), incorrectly styled "Gibbons & Reed Construction Company,"
on the ground and for the reason that appellant's sole and exclusive
remedy against her deceased husband's employer, Gibbons and Reed,
is under the provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section 35-1-60 of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act
is determinative of this action. It provides:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to
the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in
death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy
against the employer and shall be the exclusive
remedy against any officer, agent or employee
of the employer, and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this Act shall be in place
of any and all other civil liability whatsoever,
at common law or otherwise, to such employee,
widow, children, parents, dependants, next-ofkin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian,
or any other person whomsoever, on account of
any accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated or incurred
by such employee in the course of or because
of or arising out of his employment, and no
action at law may be maintained against an
employer or any other officer, agent or employee
of the employer based upon any accident, injury
or death of an employee. Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or
his dependents) from filing a claim with the

- 2 -

Industrial Commission of Utah for compensation in those cases within the provisions of
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability Act,
as amended.
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-60 (1953).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Gibbons and Reed accepts, for the purpose of this appeal,
appellant's Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts. However,
Gibbons and Reed propounds the following additional uncontroverted
facts:
1.

At the time of his death, appellant's deceased hus-

band, Lewis Junior Stewart, was employed by Gibbons and Reed. R. 18.
2.

At the time of his death, Mr. Stewart was acting

within the scope and course of his employment.
3.

R. 18.

On August 29, 1983, the date of Mr. Stewart's death,

Gibbons and Reed had in force and legal effect Workmen's Compensation Insurance as required by the State of Utah.
4.

R. 18.

All Workmen's Compenation benefits payable by reason

of Mr. Stewart's death were paid to his heirs.

R. 19.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Gibbons and Reed contends the lower court properly ruled,
based upon the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act and recent decisions

— o —

of this Court, that appellant1s sole and exclusive remedy for the
death of her husband is pursuant to the Utah Workmen's Compensation
Act.

The Workmen's Compensation Act provides the sole and exclusive

remedy against employers for injuries suffered by employees during
the course and scope of their employment.

ARGUMENT
THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT PROVIDE PLAINTIFF'S SOLE AND EXCLUSIVE
REMEDY AGAINST GIBBONS AND REED FOR THE DEATH
OF HER HUSBAND.
The Workmen's Compensation Act, enacted in Utah in 1917,
is intended to benefit employees and their dependents by providing
a measure of economic security without exposing them to the risks
and uncertainties involved in proving fault by pursuing lawsuits
against their employers for employment-related injuries.

Barber

Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d
266 (1943); United Airlines Transport Corp. v. Industrial Commission,

107 Utah 52, 151 P.2d 591

(1944); Wilstead v. Industrial

Commission, 17 Utah 2d 214, 407 P.2d 692 (1965).

The Workmen's

Compensation Act also protects employers complying with the Act
from vexatious lawsuits.
892 (Utah 1975).

Bryan v. Utah International, 533 P. 2d

For over 75 years, this Court has defended these

objectives of the Workmen 1 s Compensation Act by repelling numerous
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attacks on the exclusivity of remedy provisions found in Section
35-1-60.

In fact, the most recent decision of this Court addressing

the issue, Morrill v. J. & M. Construction Company, Inc., 635 P.2d
88

(Utah 1981), emphasizes the clear and unequivocal mandate of

Section 35-1-60 and supports the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint against Gibbons and Reed:
A reading of Title 35-1-60 . . . makes
it clear that the Act is the exclusive vehicle
for recovery of compensation for injury or
death, against the employer and other employees
to the exclusion of "any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise . . . ."
635 P.2d 89 (emphasis in original).
Appellant acknowledged before the lower court that her
deceased husband, Lewis Junior Stewart, was an employee of Gibbons
and Reed and was acting in the course and scope of his employment
at the time of his death.

Notwithstanding the language of Section

35-1-60, appellant argues, however, that because her claim against
Gibbons and Reed is grounded in strict products liability, Section
35-1-60 should not be applied to bar her civil action. 1
1

Appellant

Although not part of this appeal, it is doubtful that appellant's Complaint states a legally sufficient products liability
claim against Gibbons and Reed.
Appellant fails to allege that
Gibbons and Reed was in the business of selling machines such as
the one that plaintiff's husband was working on when he was killed
or that Gibbons and Reed did, in fact, sell the machine.
5ej~f
for example, Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts;
Harm v. Armco Steel Corp., 601 P.2d 155 (Utah 1979).
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contends, that this Court should adopt the "dual capacity'1 doctrine
which provides that employers who undertake functions other than
those of employer, are subject to all of the civil liabilities
and duties arising from the additional functions.
Appellant cites Bryan v. Utah International, supra, and
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signall Drilling Company, 658 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1983), for the proposition that Section 35-1-60 is not an
absolute bar to civil actions brought by injured employees against
their employers and, therefore, this Court's adoption of the "dual
capacity" doctrine would not be without precedent.

Both decisions

are distinguishable from the instant action.
Bryan v. Utah International involved an action brought
by an employee against his co-employee and employer for injuries
intentionally inflicted by the co-employee. The lower court dismissed the action against both the co-employee and employer on the
ground that Workmen's Compensation benefits were the injured employee's sole remedy.

On appeal, this Court reversed the lower court's

dismissal of the action against the co-employee, but affirmed as
to the employer.

In the instant action, appellant does not allege

that Gibbons and Reed intentionally injured her husband.

The Utah

International decision is, therefore, inapplicable.
The second decision, Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal
Drilling Company, did not involve an action by an injured employee

- 6 -

against his employer.

Rather, the case involved a controversy

between the employer and the defendant over the validity of an
indemnity agreement.

Neither of these decisions represent the

substantial exception to Section 35-1-60 advocated by the plaintiff
in this action.
In response to plaintiff T s argument that this Court should
adopt the "dual capacity" doctrine, Gibbons and Reed submits that
the overwhelming majority of decisions addressing the "dual capacity" doctrine have rejected it. See, 2 A. Larsen, Workmen's Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Death, Section 72.80-83 (Desk
ed., J. Duke ed. 1984).

(Addendum I ) .

Indeed, all of the cases

cited in Appellant's Brief arising in the State of California were
legislatively overridden by a 1982 Amendment to the California
Labor Code, Cal. Lab. Code Section 3602(b)(3) (West 1985).

(Adden-

dum II). The California Amendment distinguishes between equipment
manufactured and sold by an employer which ultimately injures an
employee and equipment manufactured solely for use in the employer's
business.

In the latter instance Workmen's Compensation benefits

are the injured employee's sole remedy, while in the former instance, the injured employee may maintain an independent civil
action based upon a products liability theory.

In addition, al-

though plaintiff has cited two cases from the State of Illinois
purporting to support the dual capacity doctrine, the most recent
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Illinois decision, Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machines, Inc., 82 111.
App.3d 1054, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1980), held that when a machine, designed and manufactured by an employer, is used to aid the employe e s business, the construction of the machine is auxiliary to the
business.

Consequently, the employer's duty to its employee flows

from the employment relationship and Workmen's Compensation benefits
are an injured employee's sole remedy.
Moreover, this Court has held on at least two occasions
that the exclusive remedy provisions of Section 35-1-60 apply to
allegations that an employer has furnished defective or dangerous
equipment to an employee.

In Hammer v. Gibbons and Reed Company,

29 Utah 2d 415, 510 P.2d 1104 (1973), this Court held that the claim
by an employee that his employer knowingly furnished him with a dangerous and defective machine did not state a cause of action sufficient to avoid the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

Buhler v. Gossner, 530 P.2d 803

(Utah 1975).

This

Court held that once Section 35-1-60 is determined to be applicable,
it is unnecessary and inadvisable for the Court to extend discussion
to the alleged negligence and/or improper conduct of the employer.
These decisions are buttressed by a decision by

Judge David K.

Winder, of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah, in the case of Holden v. N, L. Industries, Inc., No. C 79-0391
slip op. (D. Utah 1982).

(Addendum III).
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Judge Winder, applying

Utah law, held that the Utah courts would not adopt the "dual capacity" doctrine in a case wherein the decedent's employer allegedly
designed and manufactured
death.

the equipment causing the decedent's

Judge Winder stated that the exclusive remedy provision of

the Workmen's Compensation Act bars an injured employee's claims
against the defendant employer arising out of products liability.
In summary, appellant's argument, if adopted,

would

subject employers to civil products liability actions for virtually
every piece of equipment, tool or machine utilized and, at the same
time, require them to maintain Workmen's Compensation coverage for
other employment related injuries.

Such a result is contrary to

the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act and should not be
sanctioned by this Court.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should affirm Judge
Rigtrup's decision and reaffirm that Workmen's Compensation benefits
constitute the appellant's sole and exclusive remedy against Gibbons
and Reed for the death of her husband.
DATED this 30zJi

day of August, 1985.

LeROY iff AXLAND, ESQ.
Attorney for Respondent
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WHO ABE 'THIRD PERSONS"

§ 72.81

§ 72.80 The dual-persona doctrine
§ 72.81 Meaning of "dual persona"
An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort
suit by an employee, if—and only if—he possesses a second
persona so completely independent from and unrelated to his
status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes it as a separate legal person.
In this formulation, an attempt has been made to correct the
looseness and overextension attending the so-called "dual
capacity" doctrine. In a sense, a single legal person may be said
to have many "capacities," since that term has no fixed legal
meaning. As a result, a few courts have stretched the doctrine
so far as to destroy employer immunity whenever there was,
not a separate legal person, but merely a separate relationship
or theory of liability. When one considers how many such
added relations an employer might have in the course of a
day's work—as landowner, land occupier, products manufacturer, installer, modifier, vendor, bailor, repairman, vehicle
owner, shipowner, doctor, hospital, health services provider,
self-insurer, safety inspector—it is plain enough that this trend
could go a long way toward demolishing the exclusive remedy
principle. The relations just listed, by the way, are not hypothetical; they will all be met in the following pages. In one of
the best-known cases, Mercer v. UniroyaU Inc.,7 a truckdriver,
injured because of a blowout, discovered that the tire had been
manufactured by his employer. He brought an action based on
products liability and recovered. To get some idea of what this
might lead to, one has only to look at some of the extrapolations
that have been attempted. Thus, in an Illinois case3 the employer had merely modified a machine, and the employee
sued him in products liability as a "quasi-manufacturer." He
did not succeed. Imagine how much would remain of employ7 49 Ohio App. 279, 361 N.E2d 492 (1977).
• Rosales v. Verson Allsteei Press Co., 41 111. App. 3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553
(1976).
•(ReUO-W83
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er immunity if it were forfeited every time an employer adjusted or tinkered with a machine. In a Michigan case,9 it
happened that the glove which got caught in a drill press was
sold to plaintiff by his employer. The plaintiff brought an action—again unsuccessful—based on the vendor-vendee relationship. And in an even more far-fetched Illinois attempt, the
employer, who had obtained a crane on lease, was sued as a
"distributor of an unreasonably dangerous product." 10
Since the term "dual capacity" has proved to be subject to
such misapplication and abuse, the only effective remedy is to
jettison it altogether, and substitute the term "dual persona
doctrine." The choice of the term "persona" is not the result
of any predilection for elegant Latinisms for their own sake; it
is dictated by the literal language of the typical third-party
statute, which usually defines a third party, in the first instance, as "a person other than the employer."10-1 This is quite
different from "a person acting in a capacity other than that
of employer." The question is not one of activity, or relationship—it is one of identity. The Tennessee Supreme Court,
brushing aside all the fictitious sophistry of "dual capacity,"
nailed down this point with breathtaking simplicity:
"The employer is the employer; not some person other
* Neal v. Roura Iron Works, 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d 837 (1975).
i° Profilet v. Fallomte, 56 111. App. 3d 168,14 111. Dec. 16,371 N.E.2d 1069
(1977). Judgment for defendant.
io.i Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W 2d 912 (Ky App 1981). The administrator of the decedent's estate appealed a summary judgment ruling m
which it was found that the workmen's compensation remedy was exclusive.
The administrator sought relief against the decedent's employer as the
manufacturer of the coil of steel that caused the death under a products
liability theory as well. The court affirmed the denial of benefits on, the
products liability theory, and held that the dual capacity theory was improperly invoked. The pertinent Kentucky statute retained the exclusivity of the
workmen's compensation remedy, unleso, said the court, "[n]ew duties and
obligations on the part of the emplover . give nse to another distinct legal
persona who may be separately liable." 623 S W 2d 912.
•(Rel 10-4/83

Pub 347)
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than the employer. It is as simple as that. 11
The only way a court can break through this monolithic
truism is to resort to a legal fiction. And, as has been stressed
at several other points in the Treatise, legal fictions have no
place in the interpretation of detailed modern statutes, such as
compensation acts. Fictions were useful, if not indispensable,
tool for the expansion and adaptation of the rigid common-law
forms of action and other early common-law concepts. The
form of action known as trover could be extended to cover all
kinds of wrongful possession, by indulging the fiction that the
defendant had found the goods. Lord Holt, at a time when the
growth of business carried on through servants dictated the
necessity for a principle of vicarious liability, could simply announce a fiction, "the act of the servant is the act of the
master," and the problem was met. 12
It is one thing to resort to such fictions when the task is to
create new law out of thin air, or to break down the artificial
walls of old forms of action. It is quite another thing to take a
statute consisting of 45 pages of fine print, complete with
elaborate definitions of what the key words mean, and then
announce judicially that those words do not mean what the
legislature said they mean.
Perhaps the best way to approach a correct analysis of the
dual-persona concept is to provide illustrations of exceptional
situations in which the concept can legitimately be employed.
These will ordinarily be situations in which the law has already
clearly recognized duality of legal persons, so that it may be
realistically assumed that a legislature would have intended
that duality to be respected. The duality may be one firmly
entrenched in common law or equity. The status of a trustee
or of a guardian is a familiar example of this. No such case has
appeared in the reports, but one can readily hypothesize the
n McAlister v. Methodist Hospital of Memphis, 550 S.W.2d 240, 246
(Tenn. 1977).
12 Jones v. Hart, [Nisi prius 1698] K.B. 642, 2 Salk. 441. See § 4.20, X. 3
supra.
VRei.10-4'83

Pub 347)
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case of a trustee who, as trustee, is legal owner of a small
business. If the question should arise whether this confers immunity on him as an individual for torts he commits upon
employees of the trust business, no one would hesitate to answer in the negative.
The duality may also be created by modern statute, the
obvious example being the one-man corporation. Here again,
apart from exceptional circumstances justifying "piercing the
corporate veil," it is assumed without question that the corporation is a separate legal persona—because the statute makes
it so.
The New York Court of Appeals in 1980 produced an interesting variant on this theme involving a merger and the resulting posture of the successor corporation. In Billy v.
Consolidated Machine Tool Corp.,12 claimant's decedent was
killed by a piece of defective equipment manufactured by a
corporation which had merged with the decedent's employer
prior to the accident. Claimant received compensation from
the employer. She then sued the employer in tort on the theory that it had assumed all of the obligations and liabilities of the
manufacturing corporation when they had merged. The court
held that claimant could sue the employer in tort, as a corporate successor, since it had assumed all of the obligations and
liabilities of the third-party tort-feasor. The defective equipment was manufactured before the merger and the decedent
had never been employed by the manufacturing corporation.
Thus his employer could not claim any inherited immunity
from the manufacturing corporation, with which it had
merged, by virtue of the exclusivity provision of workers' compensation law. It would'be contrary to the beneficent purposes
of compensation law to deprive a claimant of the rights to sue
a third party in tort merely because the employer had merged
with the third party tort-feasor corporation which had manufactured the defective equipment. The court said, "Having
examined all of the pertinent precedent, we conclude that the
13 51 N.Y.2d 152, 432 N.Y.S.2d 879, 412 N.E.2d 934 (1980), motion for
reargument denied 52 N.Y.2d 829, 418 N.E.2d 69*4.
•(Rel.10-4/83

Pub.347)
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'dual capacity' doctrine as it has been applied to permit common law suits against employers in their capacities as property
owners or manufacturers of plant equipment is fundamentally
unsound."14 The Court of Appeals has thus performed a signal
service in disavowing the distorted dual-capacity doctrine
while, at the same time, demonstrating that a genuine case of
separate legal personality can be satisfactorily dealt with under
the dual persona doctrine.
In the subsections that follow, the various categories of alleged dual capacity will be specifically examined. Most will be
found clearly invalid. Few will be as clearly valid as the trustee
i« 412 N.E.2d at 939.
As to an unincorporated business, see Velardi v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc.,
178 Conn. 371, 423 A.2d 77 (1979). The employer, Valla, operated an unincorporated sole proprietorship under the name of Frank Valla Catering. An
employee alleged that hi was injured by his employer's negligent operation
of a truck at a time when his employer was acting as a "fellow employee"
for purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employer moved for,
and was granted, summary judgment on the basis of the employee's failure
to show that employer was a "fellow-employee," and of the employee's
receipt of a workmen's compensation award for the injuries sustained. The
employee appealed on the ground that his allegation of the "fellow-employee" relationship was enough of an allegation of material fact to bar
summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that whether an
employee is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act from maintaining
an action against a tortfeasor is a question of law for the Court. In addition,
the Court ruled that the employer's doing business under a separate name
was not enough to confer upon him the "dual personality" of employer and
employee. The court gave no opinion on what the result would have been
if the business had been incorporated.
As to a partnership, see Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., 110 Cal. App. 3d 605,
163 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1980). Claimant's employer, a food company, was a
limited partner in a partnership agreement with a dairy products corporation which caused claimant's injuries. The dairy products corporation asserted that, as general partner, it was also claimant's employer and therefore
immune from common law tort liability. The court held that a partner may
have a dual capacity in relation to the partnership employees. The general
partner has the burden of proving it was acting in the capacity as a separate
corporate entity promoting its own interest at the time claimant was injured.
•(Rei.10-4/83

Pub 34?)
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or the corporation. One or two are marginal, with possible
arguments either way.
§ 72.82 Owner or occupier of land
It is held with virtual unanimity that an employer cannot be
sued as the owner or occupier of land, whether the cause of
action is based on common-law obligations of landowners or on
statutes such as safe place statutes or structural work acts.15
is Alaska: State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979). The claimant received benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and then filed suit
alleging the state, her employer, had failed to maintain properly the highway on which the injury occurred. The State moved for summary judgment
on the ground that the claimant's suit was barred by the exclusive remedy
provision of the Act. The superior court denied the motion and adopted the
"dual capacity doctrine." The Alaska Supreme Court in reviewing the order
rejected the "dual capacity doctrine." Workmen's compensation provides
assured recovery to a worker without regard to fault and in return the law
makes the workmen's compensation remedy the exclusive remedy. The
"dual capacity doctrine" would have made an employer also liable in tort if,
in respect to that tort, he was in a position which placed obligations on him
distinct from his role as employer. This doctrine has been rejected in most
jurisdictions, including Alaska. Its use would have undermined the policy to
be achieved by workmen's compensation, which was certainty of remedy
gained in return for limiting the liability of the employer. The doctrine
would have emasculated the exclusive liability provision of the law.
Illinois: Walker v. Berkshire Foods, Inc., 41 III. App. 3d 95,354 N.E.2d 626
(1976). The claimant, a maintenance man, was injured as he fell through a
section of roof he was using as a platform for window washing. His employer
owned the building. The claimant attempted to bring an action against the
employer under the Structural Work Act, asserting that the employer operated under a dual capacity which impressed him with independent tort
liability as the owner of the building. The court affirmed the denial of
compensation. It stated that, as far as the dual-capacity doctrine operated,
independent tort actions were allowed only if the employer exists as two
distinct legal entities. Here, the claimant had not alleged distinct entities or
established dual capacity. The case of Marcus v. Green, 13 111. App. 3d 699,
300 N.E.2d 512 (1973), was distinguished principally on the ground that the
second "entity," that owned the building, was a partnership, of which the
employer was a member, that could as such be more readily identified as a
separate legal persona. But the court also hinted broadly that Marcus itself
might have lost its authority. ("If the Marcus decision retains any viability.
..." 354 N.E.2d 629.) The following succession of cases indicates strongly that
the court', loubts about the viability of Marcus were well founded.
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Apart from the basic argument that mere ownership of land
does not endow a person with a second legal persona or entity,
there is an obvious practical reason requiring this result. An
employer, as part of his business, will almost always own or
occupy premises, and maintain them as an integral part of
conducting his business. If every action and function connected with maintaining the premises could ground a tort suit, the
concept of exclusiveness of remedy would be reduced to a
shambles.
Although normally the premises involved are the work
premises themselves, Iowa has gone further and has extended
the circle of immunity to include an apartment building
owned by the employer, which was not used in the business,
but to which the plaintiff had been sent on a business errand.16
The rule here stated applies also to a statutory employer, if
Indiana: Kottis v. United States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976),
§ 72.83, N. 21 infra under Indiana.
Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. App. 1980). Gibson, sole owner
of the employer corporation, owned the land. Held: he cannot be sued as
landowner on a dual capacity theory.
Iowa: Jansen v. Harmon, 164 iN.W.2d 323 (Iowa 1969).
Louisiana: Herbert v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 369 So. 2d 1104 (La. App.
1979), affd 395 So. 2d 832 (La. App. 1981).
Nevada: Frith v. Harrah South Shore Corp., 92 Nev. 447, 552 P.2d 337
(1976).
New York: Minsky v. Baitelman, 281 App. Div. 910,120 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1953),
involving an employee of a partnership suing a partner as building owner.
South Carolina: Parker v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc., 275 S.C. 65, 267
S.E.2d 524 (1980).
Tennessee: Billings v. Dugger, 50 Tenn. App. 403, 362 S.W.2d 49 (1962).
Texas: Gore v. Amoco Production Co., 616 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App.
1981).
16

Jansen v. Harmon, N. 15 immediately supra under Iowa.
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the conditions for that status are met. 17 But the opposite result
may be achieved if the court concludes that the owner, although qualified to be a general contractor, was not acting as
a "contractor" on the particular project, and hence was not a
statutory employer at all.18
Moreover, if the circumstances are such that a president and
sole stockholder of a corporation would be immune to suit by
an employee, 19 he does not lose that immunity by being also
the owner of the land.20
§ 72.83

Products liability

All American jurisdictions but one hold that an employer,
who is also the manufacturer, modifier, installer, or distributor
of a product used in the work, cannot be held liable in damages
to his own employee on a theory of products liability.21 Since
(Text continued on page 14-75)
17

See, e.g., in N. 15 supra: Hebert v. Gulf States Utilities Co. (La.), Parker
v. Williams & Madjanik, Inc. (S.C.), and Billings v. Dugger (Tenn.).
18 See State v. Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1962).
i* See § 72.10 N. 3 supra.
20 Jackson v. Gibson, 409 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind. App. 1980). Defendant, the
president and sole shareholder of the corporate employer and plaintiffs
supervisor, could not be sued as a third party in his capacity as owner of the
land.
Vaughn v. Jermgan, 144 Ga. App. 745, 242 S.E.2d 482 (1978).
21

Alabama: Mapson v. Montgomery White Trucks, Inc., 357 So. 2d 971
(Ala. 1978).
Arizona: Vineyard v. Southwest Engineering & Contracting, 117 Ariz. 52,
570 P.2d 823 (1977). The workman was injured in an industrial accident and
was awarded compensation benefits. He contended that, because a collective bargaining agreement provided for the installation by the employer of
safety devices and because the installation of such safety devices could have
at least partially avoided his injuries, he was entitled to proceed directly
against the employer in a suit for damages. The court rejected the workman's contention, concluding that, because the collective bargaining agreement did not make the employer responsible for personal injury damages
arising out of the breach of the safety provisions, there was no direct promise
for the third party beneficiary to enforce. t4[I]n view of the exclusivity provi•(Rel 10-4/83
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sions of the [Workmen's Compensation] Statute which are 'part of the quid
pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are
to some extent put in balance,' absent an express agreement, the workmen's
compensation laws should offer the exclusive remedy." Treatise quoted.
Illinois: Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machines, Inc., 82 111. App. 3d 1054, 38
111. Dec. 324, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1980). Although the plaintiffs employer had
manufactured the machine which injured the plaintiff, he did not thereby
stand in so different a position to the plaintiff employee as to warrant finding
him subject, under the dual capacity doctrine, to a negligence suit. Since the
machine was used to aid the employer's business, construction of the machine was auxiliary to the business. The employer's duty therefore flowed
from the employment relationship, and not from his manufacture of the
machine. Treatise quoted.
Winkler v. Hyster Co., 54 111. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d 606 (1977).
Indiana: Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 359
N.E.2d 544 (1977). The claimant was burned over 40% of his body when a
pressure cooker, which his employer had designed, manufactured and installed, exploded and sprayed him with scalding grease. He urged that his
suit at law be maintained against the employer under a dual capacity theory.
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's dismissal. It found the injury
"precisely of the kind" to be covered by workmen's compensation, and that
it did not arrive from an obligation apart from the employer-employee
relationship. The court also noted that the claimant's argument would do
considerable violence to the exclusive nature of the compensation remedy.
Kentucky: Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. App. 1981),
§ 72.81 N. 10.1 supra.
Louisiana: Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d 599 (La.
App. 1978), cert, denied 362 So. 2d 1389.
Massachusetts: Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 857
(Mass. 1980). The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts here rejects flatly
the application of the dual capacity doctrine in a case involving an employer
who was also the manufacturer of the allegedly defective product. The court
said "[I]n this case the defendant was performing its common law function
as an employer in supplying equipment, tools, and machinery to the [employee's] division. The plaintiffs argument therefore must fail as he 'overlook^] the simple fact that the use of the product was a routine and integral
part of the employment. Dual capacity requires a distinct separate legal
persona, not just a separate theory of liability in the same legal person.' 2A,
A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 72.80, at 154 (Supp. 1979)."
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Michigan: Peoples v. Chrysler Corp., 98 Mich. App. 277, 296 N.W.2d 237
(1980). The plaintiff brought a tort action against his employer seeking damages for the injuries he received while working with an employer-provided
lubricating machine. The action was based on a separate manufacturer-user
relationship between the employer and employee. The court refused to
allow the "end-run around the statute," and affirmed the employer's grant
of summary judgment.
See also: Neal v. Roura Iron Works, Inc., 66 Mich. App. 273, 238 N.W.2d
837 (1975). The plaintiff was injured on the job when a glove, sold to him
by his employer, caught in a drill press. The court ruled that workmen's
compensation was his exclusive remedy, rejecting his argument that the suit
was based on a vendor-vendee relationship.
Nevada: Noland v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 628 P.2d 1123 (Nev.
1981).
North Dakota: Latendresse v. Preskey, 290 N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1980).
Pennsylvania: Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1070, rev'd
on other grounds 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981). A large number of
plaintiffs brought suits in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against several
manufacturers of asbestos products. Although many of the plaintiffs or their
decedents had been employed by the manufacturers they were suing, they
contended that, despite the state's workmen's compensation act, the employers should still be liable for products liability under a dual capacity
doctrine. In order to ensure uniformity among the district courts in the
district, the chief judge of the district appointed a four-judge panel to hear
arguments on the issue. The panel concluded that, although Pennsylvania
courts had not yet considered the dual capacity doctrine, they would be
likely to follow the majority and refuse to accept dual capacity. Therefore,
the court concluded that the dual capacity doctrine would be unavailable to
plaintiffs in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Texas: Cohn v. Spinks Indus., Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
Virginia: White v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 523 F. Supp. 302 (W.D.
Va. 1981). The plaintiff, an employee in an Orion-making plant, had allegedly suffered liver damage from being exposed to a chemical, dimethylformamide (DMF), which was used by his employer, duPont, in making orlon.
After being denied compensation benefits, he brought this tort action
against duPont as manufacturer of DMF. The court, noting that Virginia-had
not adopted the dual capacity doctrine, and indeed had not produced a case
that even came close to adopting it, declined to apply it.
Wisconsin: Gerger v. Campbell, 98 Wis. 2d 282, 297 N.W.2d 183 (1980).
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California abolished the dual-capacity doctrine by statutory
amendment in August, 1982,22 only Ohio23 holds contra.
All the arguments in § 72.81 against this distortion of the
22

Assembly Bill No. 684 amending § 3602 o£ the Labor Code. The amendment contains one or two exceptions, which in practice will be inconsequential. It is poignant to reflect that California, which originated the
dual-capacity doctnne, and which expanded it to the most preposterous
extreme, first in Douglas v E. & J Gallo Winery, 169 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137
Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977), and finally in Bell v Industrial Vangas, Inc., 179 Cal.
Rptr. 30, 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P 2d 266 (1981), may now have the most
restrictive rule of all on dual capacity This is because the amendment makes
no exception even for the occasional true dual-persona situation.
" Mercer v Umroyal, Inc , 49 Ohio App 2d 279, 361 N E.2d 492 (1977).
The plaintiff, a truckdnver furnished by a lease agreement to Uniroval, was
injured m a crash which occurred when the truck in which he was riding had
a blowout. The defective tire was manufactured bv Uniroval. The plaintiff
brought an action for personal injuries predicated on product liability Summary judgment was granted for Umroyal. On appeal, the plaintiff contended
that his status was not that of an injured emplovee, but that of a reasonablv
foreseeable user The majority agreed and reversed summary judgment.
The majority acknowledged that the plaintiff, as a leased employee, was able
to collect workmen's compensation. However, applying the doctnne of dual
capacity for the first time, they found Umroyal liable as manufacturer of the
defective tire The blowout and resulting crash were seen as hazards common to the public, not peculiar to the conditions of employment. Since the
cause of the injuries did not arise from the emplover-employee relationship,
the majority held it permissible for the plaintiff to sue Umroyal in two
capacities. They noted that it was only a matter of circumstance that the
defective tire was not another brand. The dissenting justice vigorously objected to the introduction of the dual capacity doctrine into Ohio law, asserting that it was contrary to the fundamental doctrines of compensation law.
Cf. Knous v Ridge Machine Co , 64 Ohio App. 2d 251,18 Ohio Op. 3d 220,
413 N E.2d 1218 (1980). Plaintiffs decedent was killed while repairing a die
casting machine that was manufactured by his employer. Plaintiff brought
a wrongful death action on the dual capacitv theory The court held that an
employer who manufactured or designed and assembled a machine for the
use of its own employees in its own production operations, and not for use
by the general public, was not subject to a manufacturer's liability when his
own employee was injured while repairing or using that machine. Treatise
quoted.
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dual persona concept apply with full force here, and need not
be repeated. It may be added that, even under the most permissive definition of dual capacity, the Ohio view cannot be
justified. The second set of obligations, under that definition,
must be independent of the defendant's obligations as an employer. Here they are completely intertwined. The employer
has a duty as employer to provide safe scaffolding; he has a
duty as manufacturer to make safe scaffolding; if he makes
unsafe scaffolding and provides it to his employee to be used
in his work, the two obligations are braided together so tightly
they cannot possibly be separated. As the Illinois court said,
since the machine was used to aid the employer's business,
construction of the machine was auxiliary to business.24
This being so, it really does not help the Ohio position to
limit dual capacity, as it has done, to cases in which the product
is sold to the public as well as furnished to the employee. 25
What matters is that, as to this emploijee, the product was
manufactured as an adjunct of the business, and furnished to
him solely as an employee, not as a member of the consuming
public. What the employer does with the rest of his output
cannot change this central fact.
§ 72.84

Departments or divisions of a single employer

§ 72.84(a)

Private employers

Dual capacity or persona will not be found merely because
the employer has a number of departments or divisions that
perhaps are quite separate in their functions and operations.
In the case of private employers, this result has been
reached in a variety of combinations of divisions or departments, such as a design department and an installation depart24

Goetz v. Avildsen Tool & Machine, Inc., N. 21 supra this subsection
under Illinois.
25

Knous v. Ridge Machine Co., N. 23 supra tHis subsection.
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ment,26 a drug store and a laundromat operated by the same
employer,27 the Talon Division of Textron Inc.,28 a separate
division of the employer that manufactured the vat29 or the
machine30 involved in the injury, and the American Bridge
division of U.S. Steel.31
§ 72.84(b) Local governments
Attempts have several times been made to subdivide a
municipality, and assert common-law rights on behalf of an
employee of one city department against a different city department as if it were a stranger. These attempts have also
been consistently unsuccessful.32 Thus, when a city has both a
fire department and a street railway line, the widow of a fireman killed by the street railway's negligence cannot maintain
a death action against the city in its capacity as street railway
operator.33
26 Miller v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. Va. 1969).
27 Hudson v. Allen, 161 N.W.2d 596 (Mich. App. 1968).
28 Strickland v. Textron, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 326 (D. S.C. 1977).
29 Taylor v. Pfaudler Sybron Corp,, 150 N J . Super. 48,374 A.2d 1222 (App.
Div. 1977).
30

Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 857 (Mass. 1980).

31

Stone v. United States Steel Corp., 384 So. 2d 17 (Ala. 1980).

32

California: Walker v. City & County of San Francisco, 97 Cal. App. 2d
901, 219 P.2d 487 (1950).
Michigan: Bross v. City of Detroit, 262 Mich. 447, 247 N.W. 14 (1933).
New York: De Guiseppe v. City of New York, 188 Misc. 897, 66 N.Y.S.2d
866, affd 273 App. Div. 1010, 79 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1948).
Washington: Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204, 595 P.2d 541
(1979).
33

Walker v. City & County of San Francisco, N. 32 immediately supra
under California.
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State governments

Similarly, at the state level, an employee of the Department
of Highways, who was injured when struck by an automobile
driven by a state trooper of the Department of Public Safety,
could not bring an action of law against the Department of
Public Safety, since both employees were employees of the
commonwealth. 34
§ 72.84(d)

Federal government

A version of the dual-capacity principle at the federal level
was also rejected in Denenberg v. United States.35 By statute 36
employees of nonappropriated Fund activities, such as the
P.X. in London, are to be provided workmen's compensation
coverage equal to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act benefits, and this is made the exclusive
remedy for an injured employee. The court held that a claim
for injuries suffered by the plaintiff which prevented her pursuing her musical career could not be sustained in the Court
of Claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, since the United
States did not waive immunity when, by statute, another exclusive remedy was provided. Summary judgment was rendered for the United States.
§ 72.85

Automobile owner's liability

The New York case of Costanza v. Mackler27 has some of the
34 Osborne v. Commonwealth, 353 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. App. 1962).
Accord, as to maintenance of highways:
State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1979).
Wright v. Moore, 380 So. 2d 172 (La. App. 1979), writ denied 382 So. 2d
164 (La. 1980).
35 305 F.2d 378 (Ct. CI. 1962).
36 5 U.S.C.A. § 150(10 (1957).
37 34 Misc. 2d 188, 227 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1962), dffd
NT.Y.S.2d 1816.

17 A.D.2d 948, 233
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characteristics of a dual-persona case. The holding was that the
coemployee immunity created by the New York Act did not
extend to the defendant employee as owner of the truck involved in the accident, and that therefore he could be held
liable under the New York vehicle owner's liability law. The
defendant regularly rented two trucks to his employer. The
alleged tort was based on the condition of the truck. A loose
floorboard had struck the plaintiff, a fellow employee of the
defendant. The court made short work of the issue by assimilating it to the situation in which the coemployee was not
in the course of his employment at the time of the accident,
and concluded:
"The alleged tort charged of the defendant is independent of and not related to the common employment of both
"38

It should be observed, however, that the Costanza problem
is not identical to that in the course-of-employment cases. In
Costanza the truck, so to speak, was in the course of employment at the time of injury. The defendant was being sued as
truck owner for his own negligence in that capacity. In this
respect the case differs from an earlier case in which, when the
negligence was that of a coemployee driving defendant employee's car, suit against the defendant employee was held
barred. 39 Here there was indeed "negligence or wrong of another in the same employ," as required by the New York statute, so that the statute could take hold on the strength of the
driver's status as coemployee, not the defendant's status as
coemployee. In Costanza the defendant was relying on his
own status as coemployee, and to defeat this defense it is necessary to say that his negligence in furnishing a defective truck
was not conduct in his capacity as coemployee.
38 227 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
39

Naso v. Lafata, § 72.24, N. 22 supra.
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§ 72.86 Other dual-persona problems
In two cases, plaintiffs have attempted to invoke the dual
capacity doctrine by assigning the employer a second role as
self-insurer. Both attempts were rightly rebuffed.40
Equally illogical and futile was one plaintiffs effort to find
a second persona in the fact that the employer had assumed
certain special responsibilities through a collectively-bargained contract calling for installation of certain safety devices.41
Finally, it may be noted that the important dual-persona
problem of doctors, hospitals and providers of health services
has for convenience been analyzed in connection with the
40 Swain v. J.G. Hudson Co., 60 Mich. App. 3 6 1 , 230 N.W.2d 433 (1975).
T h e plaintiff a t t e m p t e d to sue the decedent's employer, a self-insurer, for
negligence. It was alleged that, since an insurer could be sued as a third party
for its own negligence, an employer which was a self-insurer could be sued
in its capacity as an insurer only. T h e court held that the plaintiffs workmen's compensation r e m e d y against her employer was exclusive.
D e n m a n v. Duval Sierrita Corp., 27 Ariz. App. 684, 558 P.2d 712 (1976)
(rehearing denied) (review denied). T h e claimant brought suit against his
employer in its capacity as self-insurer. T h e court dismissed the action as an
illogical a t t e m p t to get around the exclusivity provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
41

Vineyard v. Southwest Engineering & Contracting, 117 Ariz. 52, 570
P.2d 823 (Ct. App. 1977). The workman was injured in an industrial accident
and was awarded compensation benefits. He contended that, because a
collective bargaining agreement provided for the installation by the employer of safety devices and because the installation of such safety devices could
have at least partially avoided his injuries, he was entitled to proceed directly
against the employer in a suit for damages. The court rejected the workman's contention, concluding that, because the collective bargaining agreement did not make the employer responsible for personal injury damages
arising out of the breach of the safety provisions, there was no direct promise
for the third party beneficiary to enforce. 4t[I]n view of the exclusivity provisions of the [Workmen's Compensation] Statute which are 'part of the quid
pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers are
to some extent put in balance,' absent an express agreement, the workmen's
compensation laws should offer the exclusive remedy."
•(Rel.10-4/83

Pub.347)

14-81

WHO ARE "THIRD PERSONS"

§ 72.91

general subject of physicians as third parties.42"76
§ 72.90 Insurer as third party
§ 72.91 Summary of case and statute law on insurers as
third parties
Of all the developments in the volatile field of third-party
litigation under workmen's compensation, none has been so
dramatic and fast-moving as the line of cases, mostly during
the 'sixties, in which injured employees have attempted to
treat the compensation carrier as a third party for purposes of
tort suits, usually on the basis of alleged negligence in either
safety inspections or medical services. Legislatures too were
busy, sometimes reversing the courts, sometimes confirming
them, and sometimes doing a little of each. The net result is
that, among states that have specifically dealt with the subject,
by either judicial decision or legislative amendment or both,
carriers are immune in nineteen77 states and suable in seven.78
42-7« See § 72.63 supra.
77

Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin.
78

Alabama, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, and Oklahoma.
But cf. Brooks v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 170 N.J. Super. 20, 405 A.2d
466 (1979). The claimant was injured by an allegedly defective machine at
work, and was awarded workmen's compensation benefits. He then instituted a negligence action against his employer's worker's compensation insurer, charging that it had failed to discover or remedy the hazard which
injured him when it had conducted safety inspections of the plant. A tnal
judge granted summary judgment to both defendants, and the claimant
appealed. The superior court, appellate division, affirmed the decision of the
tnal judge. The court held that the claimant had no cause of action against
the insurer when the policy permitted but did not require safety inspections,
and when the policy contained an express statement that any inspection
undertaken was to benefit the insurer and not to warrant the premises as
safe.
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N o * 19
Provisions of Workers' Compensation Law forecloaed
plaintiff from sung his employer for injuries sustained while
assisting in semcuig of printing press and, assuming that
repair specialist sent by defendant to service press became a
special employee of plaintiff's employer, thereby becoming a
coemployee of plaintiff, plaintiff was foreclosed from suing
repair specialist as well, but in absence of an employment
relationship between ptamtiif and defendant, plaintiffs right
to maintain mi action against defendant remained mtact
whether or not a special employment relationship between
repair sncaahsf and plamtnTs employer existed. Id.
No special employment relationship could be said to have
amen helwum puuntnT and defendant manufacturer during
time repair specialist sent by defendant was on premises of
phuntni s employer to service a printing press; where there
was no evidence that plaintiff or ms employer ever spoke to
defendant about plaintiff, that defendant exercised or maintained any right or control and supervision ever phnnmT, er
that phunofT ever performed work upon defendant's premise s Id.
A finding of a special employment relationship bttween
puuntnTs employer and repair specialist sent by defendant
manufacturer to service printing press on employer's premises did not compel a verdict in favor of defendant in suit by
plaintiff for injuries' sustained during course of servicing
operation smce, though plaintiff was foreclosed from suing
repair specialist m event latter was a special employee of
pfauntnTs employer and, thus, a coemployee of plaintiff,
plaintiffs nght to maintain an action against defendant as
general employer of repair specialist remained intact M.
19.5. Prassmpoons and burden of proof
Dairy products company, in order to establish affirmative
defense that injured deliveryman's exclusive remedy was
under Workmen's Compensation Act, had to prove that
injurious conduct of which the deliveryman complained was
conduct by the dairy products company on behalf of partnership, which was the deliveryman's immediate employer,
and not that such conduct was that of the dairy products
company in its capacity as proprietor of its own corporate
dairy products business, which was also general partner in
the partnership Dorado v Knudsen Corp (1980) 163
CaLRptr 477, 103 C A 3d 605
19.6. Nonsuits
In suit brought against steel subcontractor by general
concrete contractor's employee, who was injured in a crane
accident while the crane was being operated for the benefit
of plaintiff's employer, the evidence was susceptible of an
inference that no special employment relationship arose
between plaintiffs employer and defendant's crane operator,
accordingly, the trial court erred in granting a nonsuit for
defendant Marsh v Tilley Steel Co (1980) 162 Cal Rptr
320

Since ptamtuT* nght to sue defendant manufacturer for
uyunea ——imrd wink repair iproahst jent by defendant
was servicing a printing press on premises of plaintiff's
employer remaned mtact m event an employment relationship did not exist between plaintiff and defendant, instruction winch erroneously failed to preserve this nght was
prerueucial awd operated to require reversal even though it
was partly correct m stating that if plaintiff became a special
employee of defendant, he could see neither drfrnriant nor
m repav spmahat Campbell v Hams-Scybold Press Co.
(1977) 141 CaLRptc 55. 73 CA.3d 786,

A cootnrfhwg pnoaple of Workers' Compensation Act
was that workers' ooinpenaatxxs appeals board had exclusive
jurisdiction when conditions of compensation concurred,
and since discharged employee, who brought action against
ha employer and general manager on theory of intentional
infliction of emotional distress ansing out of two encounters
between employee and manager at employer's premises,
alleged that he was physically injured and disabled as a
result of defendant's acts, he suffered a compensable injury
under Act, and thus the conditions of compensation were
met and he was barred from bringing a civil suit for
damages predicated on theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Gates v Trans Video Corp (1979) 155
CaLRptr 486, 93 CA.3d 196.
Exclusive remedy provisions of this section barred employee's civil action against his employer and fellow employees for intentional infliction of emotional distress where
physical illness and disability accompanied the emotional
distress. Ankeny v Lockheed Missiles and Space Co
(1979) 151 CaLRptr 828, 88 CA.3d 531
An employee^ crvd action against his employer and fellow employees for intentional infhcoon of emotional distress
a not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of this
secMic Reatena v Orange County (1978) 147 Cal Rptr
447, 82 CA-3d 833.
22. Review
Defendant who failed to plead and prove, as affirmative
defense of action, but conditions of workers compensation
rendering him subject to protections of the act existed could
not raise such contention on appeal and decision to such
effect did not result m improper -conferral'* of subject-matter jurisdiction by means of consent, waiver or estoppel nor
was such decision altered by fact that defendant sought to
raise defense in question by means of motion for nonsuit
filed at conclusion of plaintiffs case m chief as well as by
posttnai motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding verdict Doncy v Tambouratgis (1979) 151 Cal Rptr
347, 587 P2d 1160, 23 C3d 91

§ 3602. Exclusive remedy; action "for damages; conditions of employer's liability
(a) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur, the ng!ht to recover
such compensation is, except as specifically provided in this section and Sections 3706jand 4558, the
sole and exclusive remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer, and the
fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied another or dual capacity prior to, or at
the time of, the employee's
industrial injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to
nplo
bring an action at: law
lav for damages against the employer.
(b) An employee, or his or her dependents in the event of his or her death, may bring; an
ai action at
law for damages against the employer, as if this division did not apply, in the following instances
(1) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a willful physical assault by the
employer
Underline indicates changes or additions by amendment
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Uot» 9
(2) Where the employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's fraudulent concealment of the
existence of the injury and its connection with the employment, in which case the employer's liability
shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the aggravation. The burden of proof
respecting apportionment of damages between the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is
upon the employer.
(3) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a defective product manufactured by the employer and sold, leased, or otherwise transferred for valuable consideration to an
independent third person, and that product is thereafter provided for the employee's use by a third
person.
(cj In all cases where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 do not concur, the
liability of the employer * * * shall be the same as if this division had not been enacted.
(Amended by Stats.1982, c 922, p. 3367, § 6.)
19*2

Pacific Engmernng (1983) 191 CaLRptr. 696, 143 C A J d
219.
la employee's common-law damage action against Us
employer's parent corporation as a third-party tort-feasor,
evidence that control and direction of employee was vested
in and exercised by employer, and not the parent corporation, precluded summary judgment for parent, who alleged
that employee's sole remedy was under worker's compensation scheme. Gigax v. Ralston Purina Co. (1982) 186
CaLRptr. 395, 136 CA.3d 591.
Instruction which had effect of compelling a verdict in
favor of defendant as general employer of repair specialist in
event a special employment relationship existed between
plaintiffs employer and specialist when he was sent to
premises of plaintiffs employer to service a printing press
was erroneous since, in absence of an employment relationship between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiffs right to
maintain an action against defendant remained intact despite
status of specialist Campbell v. Harris-Seyboki Press Co.
(1977) 141 CaLRptr. 55, 73 CA.3d 786.

Law Review <
Monitoring employees for genetic alteration: Is state regulation essentia?? (1984) 15 Pacific LJ. 349.
Remedy for intentional torts of a workmen's compensation carrier. Everett E. Dernier (1973) 1 Pepperdine L.Rev.
54.

Notes of Decisions
Dud capacity 5
Instruction* 3
4

1.

l«
Principle that exclusive remedy provisions do not alter
correlative rights and liabilities of parties who do not occupy
reciprocal statutes of employer and employee is not muted
by fact that employee was injured by a third party with
whom employer of injured party had entered into a consensual legal relationship. Campbell v. Harris-Seybold Press
Co. (1977) 141 CaLRptr. 55, 73 CA-3d 786.

Since plaintiffs right to sue defendant manufacturer for
injuries nwrainrd while repair specialist sent by defendant
was servicing a printing press on premises of plaintiffs
employer remained intact in event an employment relationship did not exist between plaintiff and defendant, instruction which erroneously failed to preserve this right was
prejudicial and operated to require reversal even though it
was partly correct in stating that if plaintiff became a special
employee of defendant, he could sue neither defendant nor
its repair specialist. Campbell v. Harris-Seybold Press Co.
(1977) 141 CaLRptr. 55, 73 CA.3d 786.

A finding of a special employment relationship between
njaintiff s employer and repair specialist sent by defendant
manufacturer to service printing press on employer's premises did not compel a verdict m favor of defendant in suit by
plaintiff for injuries sustained during course, of servicing
operation since, though plaintiff was foreclosed from suing
repair specialist in event latter was a special employee of
plaintiffs employer and, thus, a coempioyee of plaintiff,
plaintiffs right to maintain an action against defendant as
general employer of repair specialist remained intact. Id.

Slander action by former deputy sheriff against sheriff was
not barred by exclusive provisions of this section; gist of
action for slander is damage to reputation, which is not type
of injury contemplated by Workers' Compensation-Act
(§ 3201 et seq.). Howland v. Balma (1983) 192 CaLRptr.
286, 1 4 3 < l A J d 899.

Provisions of Workers* Compensation Law foreclosed
plaintiff from suing his employer for injuries sustained while
assisting in servicing of printing press and assuming that
repair specialist sent by defendant to service press became a
special employee of plaintiffs employer, thereby becoming a
coempioyee of plaintiff, plaintiff was foreclosed from suing
repair specialist as well, but in absence of an employment
relationship between plaintiff and defendant, plaintiffs right
to maintain his action against defendant remained intact
whether or not a special employment relationship between
repair specialist and plaintiffs employer existed. Id.

5.

Dnai capacity
Rip saw operator's claim against his employer to recover
for injuries sustained when piece-of lumber "kicked back**
. was barred by exclusivity provision of § 3601 xnd did not
fall within the so-called "dual capacity'* exception as risk of
"kick back" was an inherent risk of the job and the employer bad taken measures to obviate or minimize that danger
and it was only mere chance that the allegedly defective
piece of wood was retained for employer's use rather than
sold on open market Franco v. United Wholesale Lumber
Co. (App. 2 Distl983) 196 CaLRptr. 430. 148 C.A.3d 981.

2.

Civil actions
Liberal construction is mandated in favor of Workers'
Compensation Act's § 3201 et seq. applicability to civil suits
as well as compensation proceedings. Iverson v. Atlas

Asterisks * * * indicate deletions by amendment
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Administrative Code References
Certificate of consent to self-insure, see 8 CaLAdm. Code
15350 et seq
Revocation of certificate of self-insurance, see 8 CaLAdm.'
Code 15420 et seq

5df^
et seq.

»admuustratxn, toe 8 CaLAdm. Code 15200

§ 3702.7. Revocation of certificate of consent; fines
A certificate of consent to administer claims of s e l f ^ , ^ employers may be revoked by the
director at any time for good cause after a hearing. G o ^ CSiuae mc\u^Sf but is not limited to, the
violation of subsection (1), (2), (3), (4), or (5) of subdivision (a) o f Section 3702. In lieu of revocation of
a certificate of consent, the director may impose a fine Qf n o t l e s s t ^ f^ d o I l a r s $&) n o r m o r e
than five hundred dollars ($500) for each violation.
(Added by Stats. 1984, c 1521, p. — , § 4, operative Jurj ly ^^^
Operative July 1, ^ 5
§ 3704. Repealed by Stats. 1984, c 252, p. — , § 4, u*g cncy> cff# J u n e 27, 1 9 8 4
§ 3706. Effect of failure to secure payment of c o m p e ^ ^ , , .

action for

damages

If any employer fails to secure the payment of compensation, any injured employee or his
dependents may * • • bnng an action at law against s u ^ employer for damages, as if this division
did not apply.
1971 Amendment. Deleted a provision which allowed a
proceeding against an employer by filing an application for
compensation with the appeals board in addition to the
present method.
Law Renew Commentaries
Litigation reduction in workmen's compensation.
1 West StU.L.Rev. 87.

(1972)

Remedy for intentional torts of a workmen's compensation earner. Everett E Dernier (1973) 1 Pepperdme L-Rev.
54

Notes of Decisions
L

In general
Where at the time injured worker filed workmen's compensation claim he was unaware of extent of employer's
workmen's compensation or public liability insurance because of employer's refusal to answer interrogatories dealing
with his insurance, worker was not "apprised of the facts"
to extent that worker could be estopped from proceeding m
civil action, and it wa* thus reasonable for worker to
proceed m workmen's compensation claim and civil action
and pursue them concurrently through discovery stages until
it could be decided which afforded remedy Felix v Workme»%s Compensation Appeal Bd /)9?4> )U> Cti.Jlptr M5,
41 C.A.3d 759
Employer's payment of cost of injured worker's transportation for medical examination and disposition did not result
in prejudice to employer which would collaterally estop
worker from proceeding tn civil action since such expenses
would have been incurred by employer m civil action in any
event and since information was produced that was valuable
to defense of either workmen's compensation proceeding or
civil action. Id.

™ ~ * and worker could continue to pursue both remedies.
Id.
*"^Ung physician could be sued independent of his
^ ° ^ e r company for alleged malpractice m aggravation of
^PJ°Vee's industrially incurred injury. Hodman v. Roges
(1972) w CaLRptr. 455, 22 CA.3d 655.
em

proceeding—la general
""^re claimant made no showing that he had not been
P ai ~J^mpensati0n in accordance with his claim as required
*° ^"^g him within the exception in tins section allowing a
separau cavil action against employer for damages, he could
not, aft^ h B c I a i 0 1 jy^j yX)Cn jg^j^j JUXJ settlement had been
approv^j ^ workmen's compensation appeal board, mamtmn a c
hon against employer for same amines on theory that
cm
PJ°^er was guilty of wilful and reckless conduct Nelson
M
* f*lclad Insulation Corp. (1975) 118 CaLRptr 725, 44
C A.3<* 4 7 4
Tn

%ttonal notions of fairness argue against holding that
fying of workmen's compensation claim operates as
binding election ^ proceed to conclusion before workmen's
COfnpc
hsation appeals board. Felix v. Workmen's Compcnsitl0n
Appeals Bd (1974) 116 Cal.Rptr 345, 41 C.A3d
759
mcre

12.

Headings, actions and proceedings
^en of employer to show, as affirmative defense to
* CI,on * that workmen's compensation coverage provides exelusive remedy available to plamtftT includes showing,
through appropriate pleading and proof, that defendant
secur
Sd the payment of compensation" in accordance with
P r o ^ S n s of the act Doney v Tambouratgis (1979) 151
CaLR
P t r . 347, 587JP 2d 1W0, 23 C 3 d 91.
Bur

* • "~— Defenses, w general, actions and proceedings
or not undisputed acts by alleged employer in
arran ,
S ng for worker's compensation policy, paying SI,000,
*"" lnVn deducting some payments from employee-hauler's
P*v lc8ally constituted secunng payment of compensation so
that « n pj 0 yer could claim as an affirmative defense that
worker s compensation coverage provided exclusive remedy
a
abj c in action arising out of alleged wrongful death of

Although injured worker filed workmen's compensation
proceeding before filing civil action and worker had, under
court order, received answers to interrogatones concerning
employer's insurance, election of remedies had not been

Underline i n d i t e ,
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9 4553.1. Required findings
In order to support a holding of serious and willful misconduct by an employer based upon
violation of a safety order, the appeals board must specifically find all of the following:
• » •
(1} The specific manner in which the order was violated. • • •
(2) That the violation of the safety order did proximately cause the injury or death, and the specific
manner in which the violation constituted the proximate cause.
(3) That the safety order, and the conditions making the safety order applicable, were known to,
and violated by, a particular named person, either the employer, or a representative designated by
Section 4553, or that the condition making the safety order applicable was obvious, created a
probability of serious injury, and that the failure of the employer, or a representative designated by
Section 4553, to correct the condition constituted a reckless disregard for the probable consequences.
(Amended by Stats.1982, c 922, p. 3369, § 11.)
1982 Amendment. Rewrote tbe section.

§ 4554. Employer's failure to secure payment of compensation
Cross References
Agency or organization performing officiating services
relating to amateur sporting events, application of section,
see § 3706.5.

and attorney's fees assessed against employer because of his
willful failure to secure workmen's compensation. Bores v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1974) 113 CalRptr.
217, 520 P.2d 1033, 11 C3d 171.

Notes of Decisions
Construction and application
Uninsured employers fund was required to pay employee
full award of workmen's compensation award for which his
employer would be liable, including ten percent "penalty"

The ten percent increase in compensation recoverable for
willful failure of the employer to insure as provided in this
section, and the reasonable attorney's fee in addition to the
amount of compensation recoverable that may be awarded
under Labor C. § 4555 ts not chargeable to the uninsured
employer's rand. Flores v. Falcon (1973) 38 CaiComp.
Cases 667.

1.

§ 4555. Attorney's fees
Gross References
Agency or organization performing officiating services
relating to amateur sporting events, application of section,
see § 3706.5.

Notes of Decisions
L

In general
Uninsured employers fund was required to pay employee
full award of workmen's compensation award for which his
employer would be liable, including ten percent "penalty"
and attorney's fees assessed against employer because of his
willful failure to secure workmen's compensation. Flores v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1974) 113 Cal.Rptr.
217, 520 P.2d 1033, 11 C3d 171.

The ten percent increase in compensation recoverable for
willful failure of the employer to insure as provided in Ubor
C. § 4 5 *4- and the reasonable attorney's fee in addition to
tnc
amount of compensation recoverable that may be awarded under this section is not chargeable to the uninsured
employer's ftind. Flores v. Falcon (1973) 38 CaLComp.
Cases 667.
„
2. Failure to secure payment
Under this section to effect that, in case of failure by
employer to secure payment of workmen's compensation,
appeals board may award reasonable attorney's fee in addition to amount of compensation recoverable, the additional
award is applicable whenever employer fails to secure compensation, whether failure is willful or not. Flores v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. (1974) 113 CalRptr. 217,
520 P.2d 1033, 11 C3d 171.

§ 4558. Removal or noninstallation of power press guards; definitions; actions for injury or
death; proof required; contribution
(a) As used in this section:
(1) "Employer" means a named identifiable person who is, prior to the time of the employee's
injury or death, an owner or supervisor having managerial authority to direct and control the acts of
employees.
(2) "Failure to install" means omitting to attach a point of operation guard either provided or
required by the manufacturer, when the attachment is required by the manufacturer and made
Asterisks * * * Indicate deletions by amendment
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known by him or her to the employer at the time of acquisition, installation, or manufacturer-required modification of the power press.
(3) "Manufacturer" means the designer, fabricator, or assembler of a power press.
(4) 'Tower press" means any material-forming machine that utilizes a die which is designed for
use in the manufacture of other products.
(5) "Removal" means physical removal of a point of operation guard which is either installed by
the manufacturer or installed by the employer pursuant to the requirements or instructions of the
manufacturer.
(6) "Specifically authorized" means an affirmative instruction issued by the employer prior to the
time of the employee's physical injury or death, but shall not mean any subsequent acquiescence in,
or ratification of, removal of a point of operation safety guard
(b) An employee, or his or her dependents "in the "event of the employee's death, may bring an
action at law for damages against the employer where the employee's injury or death is proximately
caused by the employer's knowing removal of, or knowing failure to install, a point of operation
guard on a power press, and this removal or failure to install is specifically authorized by the
employer under conditions known by the employer to create a probability of serious injury or death.
(c) No
installed,
conveyed
employer

liability shall arise under this section absent proof that the manufacturer designed,
required, or otherwise provided by specification for the attachment of the guards and
knowledge of the same to the employer. Proof of conveyance of this information to the
by the manufacturer may come from any source.

(d) No right of action for contribution or indemnity by any defendant shall exist against the
employer; however, a defendant may seek contribution after the employee secures a judgment
against the employer pursuant to the provisions of this section if the employer fails to discharge his
or her comparative share of the judgment
(Added by Stats.1982, c 922, p. 3369, § 12.)
Library References
Workers' Compensation <*»938.
CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation § 331

ARTICLE 2. MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL TREATMENT
Section
4600.
Provision by employer; liability for failure to provide; treatment by personal physician;
medical examinations; operative date.
4601.
Request for change of physician or chiropractor by employee; consulting physician or
chiropractor, expense of treatment
4601.5. Repealed.
4603.
Change of physician or chiropractor by employer.
4603.2. Notice of selection of physician; physician's reports; payment for services.
4603.5. Format and content of notices; reasonable geographic areas; time limits for notices and
responses; notification of employees' rights.
4606.
Public entities; self-insured employer under Workmen's Compensation, Insurance and
Safety Act.
4607.
Attorney fees; successful defense by injured employee.
4608.
Pharmacy benefits; claim form reproductions [New].
Law Review Commentaries
Determination of post earnings potential.
C.L.R. 289.

(1973) 61

Workmen's compensation and vocational rehabilitation in
California. Kelly W Bixby (1972) 9 San Diego L.Rev. 961

§ 4600. Provision by employer; liability for failure to provide; treatment by personal physician;
medical examinations; operative date
Medical, surgical, chiropractic, and hospital treatment, including nursing, medicines, medical and
surgical supplies, crutches, and apparatus, including artificial members, which is reasonably required
to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury shall be provided by the employer. In the case of his
Underline Indicates changes or additions by amendment
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ADDENDUM
III
Holden v. N. L. Industries, Inc., No. C 79-0391
slip op. (D. Utah 1982)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
REBECCA HOLDEN, GREGORY
HOLDEN, DENISE HOLDEN, and
JEFFREY HOLDEN, by and
through their Parent and Next
Friend DEBRA HOLDEN and
DEBRA HOLDEN,
Plaintiffs,

<T>
3DC

r>0
• .

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS
C i v i l No:

- i •'/> 5?

^

- J ^ ~
^ O ~ i r^;

c-<.

m

C-79-0391

-vsN L INDUSTRIES, INC., a
corporation,
Defendant.
Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Counts of plaintiffs' complaint was orally argued on
December 28, 1979.

Plaintiffs were represented by Ralph L.

Dewsnup and defendant was represented by J. Dennis Frederick.
Prior to the hearing, the court had read the memoranda of counsel.
Following argument, the court granted defendant's motion to
dismiss the Third, Fourth and Fifth Counts of plaintiffs' complaint
and ruled that the order would be appealable.

Thereafter, and

following further argument and submissions from counsel, that
order was withdrawn and the court agreed to certify the legal
issues involved in this case to the Utah Supreme Court inasmuch
as that court had never ruled on these issues.
By its opinion of April 28", 1981 the Utah Supreme
Court held that the Utah Constitution does not allow it to answer
questions of law certified to it by federal courts.
the request for certification was dismissed.

Accordingly,

The parties have

now resubmitted defendant's motion to this court and the court
has reread all of the memoranda and various of the authorities
that have been cited to the court.

Being now fully advised,

IT IS ORDERED that the Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth
Counts of plaintiffs' complaint are dismissed and this order

shall be appealable.

Plaintiffs' attorney is to prepare an

appropriate order in accordance herewith.
In this case the plaintiffs are the widow and surviving
children of Glenn Holden who was killed in an explosion that
occurred on July 11, 1977 and while working in defendant's
magnesium plant in Rowley, Utah.

There is no question but that

the decedent was working and was within the scope of his
employment with the defendant at the time he was killed.
Plaintiffs in their complaint have claimed a right to recover
damages from the defendant for the alleged wrongful death of
Mr. Holden.

Count One has alleged general intentional misconduct

and the following four counts, which are m

question here,

allege fraud, negligent installation, strict product liability
and product negligence.

By the Second through Fifth Counts of

their complaint plaintiffs rely upon theories which are claimed
to pierce the exclusive remedy provisions of Utah's Workmen's
Compensation Act.

The defendant claims that those exclusive

remedy provisions cannot be pierced and that they provide complete
protection from liability of the claims alleged against it by
plaintiffs m

Counts II through V of their complaint.

There are no Utah cases that deal with the legal issues
before this court.

There are a number of cases from other

jurisdictions and these are cited in the parties' memoranda and
will not be cited herein.

There are two questions to be decided

by this court and the court's answers to these questions are as
follows:
1.

The court holds that the exclusive remedy provision

of Utah's Workmen's Compensation Act, § 35-1-60, U.C.A. 1953,
bars plaintiffs' claims against the defendant employer and where
plaintiffs have alleged that the defendant employer committed the
intentional tort of fraud upon plaintiffs' decedent which caused
his death.

2.

The court further holds that the exclusive remedy

provision of that same act bars plaintiffs' claims against
defendant employer arising out of negligent installation of
the equipment which injured plaintiffs' decedent and out of
product liability where plaintiffs have alleged that the cause
of action against the defendant arose out of actions, conduct
and relationships which were independent of defendant's status
as an employer.

In other words, this court has determined that

the so-called "dual capacity doctrine" would not be recognized
or adopted by the Utah Supreme Court.
Dated this

/ X ^ d a y of March, 1982.

•A

' ha<.rk:h LJ'<:/i

David K. Winder
United States District Judge

Mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to the
following named counsel this

/%

day of March, 1982.

Mr. W. Eugene Hansen, Esq.
Mr« Ralph L. Dewsnup, Esq.
2020 Beneficial Life Tower
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. J. Dennis Frederick, Esq.
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Secretary

